Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium by Philippe Jehiel




aCERAS-ENPC, CNRS (URA 2036), 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, France
bUniversity College, London, UK
Received7 March 2003; ﬁnal version received10 December 2003
Abstract
In complex situations, agents use simpliﬁedrepresentations to learn how their environment may
react. I assume that agents bundle nodes at which other agents must move into analogy classes,
andagents only try to learn the average behavior in every class. Speciﬁcally, I propose a new
solution concept for multi-stage games with perfect information: at every node players choose
best-responses to their analogy-basedexpectations, andexpectations correctly represent the
average behavior in every class. The solution concept is shown to differ from existing concepts,
andit is appliedto a variety of games, in particular the centiped e game, andultimatum/bargaining
games. The approach explains in a new way why players may Pass for a large number of periods in
the centipede game, and why the responder need not be stuck to his reservation value in ultimatum
games. Some possible avenues for endogenizing the analogy grouping are also suggested.
r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: C72; D81
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1. Introduction
Standard game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational both in their
ability to form correct expectations about other players’ behavior andin their ability
to select best-responses to their expectations. The game of chess is a striking example
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E-mail address: jehiel@enpc.fr.in which the standard approach is inappropriate. In chess, it is clearly impossible to
know (learn) what the opponent might do in any event (i.e. at every board position).
In complex situations, players are better viewedas using simpliﬁedrepresentations
to learn how their environment may react. The main theme of this paper is about
understanding the effects of such simpliﬁcations onto the limiting outcomes that
wouldemerge after learning has taken place (these will be compactly d escribed
through the use of an equilibrium concept). Speciﬁcally, I assume the simpliﬁcations
take the form that players bundle nodes at which other players must move into
analogy classes, andevery player only tries to learn the average behavior in each
analogy class that he considers (as opposed to trying to learn the behavior at every
single decision node of his opponents).
The aim of this paper is twofold. The ﬁrst objective is to propose a solution
concept to describe the interaction of players forming their expectations by analogy
(as explainedabove). This will be calledthe analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium.
The secondobjective is to analyze the properties of analogy-basedexpectation
equilibria in various strategic interaction contexts, andshow how new phenomena
may arise. We will also brieﬂy mention some possible avenues for endogenizing the
analogy grouping.
The games we consider are multi-stage games with almost perfect information and
perfect recall. That is, simultaneous moves andmoves by Nature are allowed . But, in
any stage, all previous moves are assumedto be known to every player. The
partitioning into analogy classes usedby the players is given exogenously, andit is
viewedas part of the d escription of the strategic environment.
1 An analogy class ai of
player i is a set of pairs ðj;hÞ such that player j; jai; must move at node h: If two
elements ðj;hÞ and ðj0;h0Þ belong to the same analogy class, the action spaces of
player j at node h andof player j0 at node h0 are required to be identically labelled.
Player i’s analogy-based expectation bi is player i’s expectation about the average
behavior of other players in every analogy class ai considered by player i—we will
denote by biðaiÞ the expectation in the analogy class ai: An analogy-based expectation
equilibrium is a pair ðs;bÞ where s is a strategy proﬁle and b is an analogy-based
expectation proﬁle such that two conditions are satisﬁed. First, for each player i and
for each node at which player i must move, player i’s strategy si is a best-response to
his analogy-basedexpectation bi:
2 Second, for each player i andanalogy class ai;
player i’s expectation biðaiÞ correctly represents the average behavior in class ai as
induced by the strategy proﬁle s (where the behavior of player j at node h; ðj;hÞAai;
is weightedby the frequency with which ðj;hÞ is visitedaccord ing to s—relative to
other elements in ai).
3
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eventually manage to have correct analogy-basedexpectations (andnot as resulting
from introspection or calculations on the part of the players). Thus, the approach
does not require the players to have any prior knowledge about the analogy classes
usedby other players (nor about these players’ payoffs). It only requires the players
to be aware of their own payoffs andof the move structure in the game (i.e., the
actions spaces at every decision node of every player).
The approach captures the following aspects of analogy-basedreasoning. First, as
the common sense of the word‘analogy’ suggests, several problems (here
expectations) are dealt with together by every player. Second, the correctness of
expectations implies that, in any given class, contingencies which are visitedmore
often contribute more to the expectation than contingencies which are visitedless
often. Accordingly, the behaviors in frequently visited contingencies contaminate the
expectation usedin all contingencies of the analogy class no matter how often they
are visited. The extrapolation (here of the expectation) from more visited to less
visitedcontingencies is—I believe—a key feature of the analogy id ea.
In Section 2, I provide a preview of how the solution concept works in a two-
player setup in which either normal form game G or G0 is playedwith probability 1
2;
andone player bund les the two games into a single analogy class in ord er to assess
the behavior of his opponent. The example helps clarify how the analogy-based
expectation equilibrium cannot be viewedas a stand ardequilibrium (say a Nash–
Bayes or sequential equilibrium) of another game, even by varying the information
structure (while keeping the payoff andmove structures). So the analogy-based
expectation equilibrium is an entirely new solution concept whose properties needto
be investigated. It is formally deﬁned in Section 3. At the end of Section 3 we make a
few preliminary observations. First, we note that an analogy-basedexpectation
equilibrium always exists in ﬁnite environments. Second, whenever all players use the
ﬁnest partitioning as their analogy devices, the strategy proﬁle of an analogy-based
expectation equilibrium coincides with a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. But,
otherwise (as illustratedin Section 2) the play of an analogy-basedexpectation
equilibrium neednot coincid e with that of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium nor
with that of a Nash equilibrium.
In Section 4, we apply the approach to the centipede game [26]. In this game, if a
player knows that his opponent will Take in the next periodhe prefers Taking in the
current period, and in the last period it is a dominant strategy to Take. Thus, in the
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, players Take whenever they have to move
despite the fact that the payoffs attached to late Take are signiﬁcantly higher than
the payoffs attachedto early Take. By contrast, in the analogy-basedapproach
players may keep passing for a large number of periods. More precisely, for a wide
range of analogy grouping, there exists an equilibrium in which players only consider
Taking whenever the game reaches a late stage.
4
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andTang [20].
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assess the behavior of his opponent. If players Pass most of the time, consistency
implies that each player should expect his opponent to Pass on average with a very
large probability. Given such expectations, players ﬁndit ind eedoptimal to Pass in
all but a few periods toward the end of the game, because they are sufﬁciently
conﬁdent that the game will not end at the next node. The key reason why the logic
of backward induction fails in this case is that players do not perceive exactly when
the other player stops Passing. Due to their analogy partitioning, players only have a
fuzzy perception of their opponent’s behavior: they only assess their opponent’s
average behavior without being able to tell exactly when the opponent Takes. We
will comment later on how the analogy-basedapproach d iffers from the crazy type
approach andother approaches to the ﬁnite horizon parad oxes.
5
In Section 5, we brieﬂy apply the approach to take-it-or-leave-it offer games and
to ultimatum andbargaining games. In take-it-or-leave-it situations, we observe that
whenever the proposer assesses the probability of acceptance only according to
whether his offer is above or below a threshold, the responder may get a payoff that
lies strictly above his payoff from refusing the offer (his reservation value), or there
may be no agreement despite the presence of positive surplus. In ultimatum and
bargaining games, we ﬁndthat the respond er of the ultimatum game may get a
signiﬁcant share of the pie whenever the acceptance decision node of the ultimatum
game is bundled with that of the bargaining game for the various alternative offers.
In Section 6, we brieﬂy discuss several possible avenues for endogenizing the
analogy partitions. A discussion of the literature and concluding remarks appear in
the last section.
2. Preview of the solution concept
Before getting into formal deﬁnitions, it may be helpful to illustrate the idea of the
solution concept through a simple example.
Two players i ¼ 1;2 must play a normal form game which is either G or G0 each
with probability 1
2: Whether the game is G or G0; player 1 must choose an action in
fU;Dg; andplayer 2 must choose an action in fL;M;R;R0g: Players are assumedto
know which game G or G0 is being playedat the time they make their d ecision. The
payoff matrixes of games G and G0 are given in the following table:
Both G and G0 have a unique Nash equilibrium, which is ðU;RÞ in game G and
ðD;R0Þ in game G0: Thus, in the standard rationality paradigm, players 1 and 2
wouldget a payoff of 2 and4 ; respectively.
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order to assess the behavior of player 2: Player 2 is still assumedto assess the
behavior of player 1 separately for games G and G0: The Nash equilibrium is no
longer an equilibrium in such an analogy setting. If it were, player 1 wouldexpect
player 2 to play R and R0 each with probability 1
2 (remember that the two games are
playedwith equal probability) without being able to d istinguish player 2’s behavior
according to the effective game (G or G0) being played. Player 1’s best-response to
such an expectation wouldbe D in game G ð1
2   1 þ 1
2   241
2   2 þ 1
2   0Þ and U in game
G0 ð1
2   2 þ 1
2   141
2   0 þ 1
2   2Þ; thus being inconsistent with the assumedplay of player 1 :
The following is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium under the considered
proﬁle of analogy grouping:
6
Strategy proﬁle: Player 1 plays D in game G and U in game G0: Player 2 plays L in
game G and M in game G0:
Analogy-based expectations: Player 1 expects player 2 to play L and M each with
probability 1
2 (in his unique analogy class). Player 2 expects player 1 to play D in
game G and U in game G0:
To check that the above pair of strategy proﬁle andanalogy-basedexpectations
constitute an equilibrium, note that given the strategy proﬁle, players’ analogy-based
expectations are consistent (G and G0 are playedwith the same probability, thus half
of the time player 2 plays L andhalf of the time he plays M). Given player 1’s
analogy-basedexpectation, player 1 chooses D (resp. U) rather than U (resp. D)i n
game G (resp. G0) because 1
2ð3 þ 3Þ41
2ð0 þ 5Þ: Given player 1’s strategy, player 2’s
best-response is L in game G and M in game G0:
It is worth noting that player 1 now derives an equilibrium payoff of 3 in game G
and4 in game G0: Thus, player 1 gets strictly more with the coarse analogy grouping
than with the ﬁne analogy grouping when player 2 is assumedto be rational.
7 We
will make further use of this observation in Section 6 when considering some possible
avenues for endogenizing the analogy grouping.
Another important observation is that in the above analogy-basedexpectation
equilibrium, both players 1 and2 behave d ifferently in games G and G0: Hence (even
by varying the payoff matrix speciﬁcations), it is not possible to interpret their
behavior as resulting from a lack of information as to which game (G or G0) is being
played. Thus, the analogy-based expectation equilibrium is a new solution concept,
andcannot be red ucedto an existing solution concept.
Comment: The analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium cannot either be viewedas a
Bayesian equilibrium with subjective prior in which player 1 wouldwrongly believe
that player 2 does not distinguish between G and G0 (while in fact player 2 would
distinguish between the two games). If player 1 were to solve for the game in which
player 2 does not distinguish G and G0; he couldnot ﬁndit optimal to play D in G
and U in G0: If that were the case, player 2 wouldthen strictly prefer playing L
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2 3 þ 1
2 0; M wouldgive: 1
2 0 þ 1
2 2; R wouldgive: 1
2 0 þ 1
2 0;
R0 wouldgive: 1
2 0 þ 1
2 1), andplayer 1’s best-response to L is U in both G and G0:
3. A general framework
3.1. The class of games
We consider multi-stage games with almost perfect information and perfect recall
(see Fudenberg and Tirole [10, Section 3.3.2]). That is, simultaneous moves and
moves by Nature are allowed. But, in any stage, all previous moves are assumed to
be known to every player.
In the main part of the paper, we will restrict attention to games with a ﬁnite
number of stages such that, at every stage andfor every player (includ ing Nature),
the set of pure actions is ﬁnite. This class of (ﬁnite) multi-stage games with almost
perfect information is referredto as G:
The standard representation of an extensive form game in class G includes the set
of players i ¼ 1;y;n denoted by N; the game tree U; andthe VNM preferences ui of
every player i deﬁned on lotteries over outcomes in the game.
A node in the game tree U is denoted by h; and the set of nodes is denoted by H:
The set of nodes at which player i must move is denoted by Hi; andfor every such
node hAHi; we let AiðhÞ denote player i’s action space at node h:
3.1.1. Classes of analogy
Each player i forms an expectation about the behavior of other players by pooling
together several contingencies in which these other players must move. Each such
pool of contingencies is referredto as a class of analogy. Player i forms an expectation
about the average behavior in each analogy class that he considers.
Formally, each player i partitions the set fðj;hÞAN   Hj; jaig into subsets ai
calledanalogy classes.
8 The collection of player i’s analogy classes ai is referredto as
player i’s analogy partition, andit is d enotedby Ani: When ðj;hÞ and ðj0;h0Þ are in the
same analogy class ai; we require that AjðhÞ¼Aj0ðh0Þ: That is, in two contingencies
ðj;hÞ and ðj0;h0Þ that player i treats by analogy, the action space of the involved
player(s) shouldbe the same.
9 The common action space in the analogy class ai will be
denoted by AðaiÞ: The proﬁle of analogy partitions ðAniÞiAN will be denoted by An:
3.1.2. Strategic environment
A strategic environment in our setup not only speciﬁes the set of players N; the
game tree U andplayers’ preferences ui: It also speciﬁes how the various players
partition the set of nodes at which other players must move into classes of analogy,
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S
k xk ¼ X and xk-xk0 ¼ | for kak0:
9More generally, we couldallow the players to relabel the original actions of the various players as they
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being equal).




An analogy-basedexpectation for player i is denoted by bi: It speciﬁes for every
player i’s analogy class ai; a probability measure over the action space AðaiÞ: This
probability measure is denoted by biðaiÞ; and biðaiÞ shouldbe interpretedas player
i’s expectation about the average behavior in class ai:
3.2.2. Strategy
A behavioral strategy for player i is denoted by si: It is a mapping that assigns to
each node hAHi at which player i must move a distribution over player i’s action
space at that node.
10 That is, it speciﬁes for every hAHi a distribution—denoted
siðhÞADAiðhÞ—according to which player i selects actions in AiðhÞ when at node h:
We let s i denote the strategy proﬁle of players other than i; andwe let s denote the
strategy proﬁle of all players.
3.2.3. Sequential rationality
Given his analogy-basedexpectation bi; player i constructs a strategy proﬁle for
players other than i that assigns player j to play according to biðaiÞ at node h
whenever ðj;hÞAai: (This is the simplest andmost natural strategy proﬁle compatible
with player i’s belief bi:)
11 The criterion usedby player i is that of best-response
against this induced strategy proﬁle at every node where player i must move.






j ðhÞ¼biðaiÞ whenever ðj;hÞAai:
Given player i’s strategy si andgiven nod e h; we let sijh denote the continuation
strategy of player i induced by si from node h onwards. Similarly, we let s ijh and sjh
be the strategy proﬁles induced by s i and s; respectively, from node h onwards. We
also let uh
i ðsijh;s ijhÞ denote the expected payoff obtained by player i when the play
has reachednod e h; andplayers behave accord ing to the strategy proﬁle s:
Deﬁnition 1 (Criterion). Player i’s strategy si is a sequential best-response to the
analogy-basedexpectation bi if andonly if for all strategies s0










10Mixedstrategies andbehavioral strategies are equivalent since we consid er games of perfect recall.
11In general there may be other strategies that couldgenerate the same analogy-basedexpectation bi:
Other notions of best-responses to the analogy-based expectations can accordingly be proposed.
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In equilibrium, I require the analogy-basedexpectations of the players to be
consistent. That is, to correspondto the real average behavior in every consid ered
class where the weight given to the various elements of an analogy class must itself be
consistent with the real probabilities of visits of these various elements.
I think of the consistency requirement as resulting from a learning process in
which players wouldeventually manage to have correct analogy-basedexpectations.
In line with the literature on learning in games (see Fudenberg and Levine [9]),
I distinguish according to whether or not consistency is only required for those
analogy classes that are reachedwith strictly positive probability.
12
To present formally the consistency idea, let PsðhÞ denote the probability that
node h is reachedaccord ing to the strategy proﬁle s:
Deﬁnition 2 (Weak consistency). Player i’s analogy basedexpectation bi is

















whenever PsðhÞ40 for some h and j such that ðj;hÞAai:
The consistency criterion can be interpretedas follows. Suppose that players
repeatedly act in the environment as described above. Suppose further that the true
pattern of behavior adopted by the players is that described by the strategy proﬁle s:
Consider player i who tries to forecast the average behavior in the analogy class ai;
assumedto be reachedwith positive probability (accord ing to s).
The actual behavior in the analogy class ai is an average of what every player j
actually does in each of the nodes h where ðj;hÞAai; that is, sjðhÞ: The correct
weighting of sjðhÞ shouldcoincid e with the frequency with which ðj;hÞ is visited
(according to s) relative to other elements in ai: The correct weighting of sjðhÞ
shouldthus be PsðhÞ=ð
P
ðj;hÞAai PsðhÞÞ; which in turn yields expression (1).
It shouldbe notedthat Deﬁnition 2 places no restrictions on player i’s
expectations about those analogy classes that are not reachedaccord ing to s: The
next deﬁnition proposes a stronger notion of consistency (in the spirit of trembling
handor sequential equilibrium, see Kreps andWilson [17]) that places restrictions
also on those expectations.
Formally, let S0 be the set of totally mixedstrategy proﬁles, i.e. strategy proﬁles s
such that for every player j; for every node hAHj at which player j must move, any
action aj in the action space AjðhÞ is playedwith strictly positive probability. For
every strategy proﬁle sAS0; all analogy classes are reachedwith positive probability.
Thus, there is a unique analogy-basedexpectation bi that is consistent with s in the
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12When it is required for unreached classes, the underlying learning model should involve some form of
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expectation by bi/sS:
Deﬁnition 3 (Strong consistency). Player i’s analogy-basedexpectation bi is strongly
consistent with s if andonly if there exists a sequence of totally mixedstrategy
proﬁles ðskÞ
N





In equilibrium, I require that at every node players play best-responses to their
analogy-basedexpectations (sequential rationality) andthat expectations are
consistent. I deﬁne two solution concepts according to whether or not consistency
is imposedon analogy classes that are not reachedalong the playedpath. AndI refer
to a pair ðs;bÞ of strategy proﬁle andanalogy-basedexpectation proﬁle as an
assessment.
Deﬁnition 4. An assessment ðs;bÞ is an analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium (resp.
a self-conﬁrming analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium) if andonly if for every
player iAN;
1. si is a sequential best-response to bi and
2. bi is strongly consistent (resp. consistent) with s:
It may be worth stressing a few notable differences between an analogy-based
expectation equilibrium anda sequential equilibrium of an extensive form game with
incomplete information. First, observe that an analogy partition of, say player i; is a
partition of the nodes where players other than i must move. It is thus of a different
nature than player i’s information structure in a game with incomplete information
which refers to a partition of the nodes where player i himself must move.
13 Second,
observe the different nature of player i’s analogy-basedexpectation bið Þ andof
player i’s belief system in extensive form games with incomplete information. Here
biðaiÞ is an expectation (or belief) about the average behavior of players other than i
in class ai: It is not a belief, say, about the likelihoodof the various elements ðj;hÞ
pooledin ai: Finally, note that in the analogy setup, the same expectation is usedto
assess the behavior of the opponent(s) in two elements of an analogy class. By
contrast, in the incomplete information setup a player behaves in the same way at
two nodes of a common information set. These differences can be seen in the simple
setup developed in Section 2, thus revealing that the analogy-based expectation
equilibrium is an entirely new solution concept that cannot be interpretedas a
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3.3. Preliminary results
Two simple observations follow. The ﬁrst one shows the relation of the analogy-
basedexpectation equilibrium to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when all
players use the ﬁnest partitioning as their analogy device. The second one shows the
existence of analogy-basedexpectation equilibria in ﬁnite environments.
Proposition 1. Consider an environment ðN;U;ui;AnÞ in which all players use the ﬁnest
analogy partitioning.
14 Then if ðs;bÞ is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of
ðN;U;ui;AnÞ; s is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of ðN;U;uiÞ:
Proof. When players use the ﬁnest analogy partitioning, strong consistency of bi with
respect to s implies that s
bi
 i ¼ s i: Proposition 1 then follows from Deﬁnition 1. &
When at least one player, say player i; does not use the ﬁnest partition as his
analogy device, the play of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium need not
correspondto that of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This is because in an
analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium ðs;bÞ; player i’s strategy si is requiredto be a
best-response to s
bi
 i: But, s
bi
 i neednot (in general) coincid e with s i as in a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. This has been illustratedin Section 2 andwill be further
illustratedthroughout the paper.
Proposition 2 (Existence). Every ﬁnite environment ðN;U;ui;AnÞ has at least one
analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
Proof. The strategy of proof is the same as that for the existence proof of sequential
equilibria [17]. I mention the argument, but for space reasons I do not give the details
of it. First, assume that in every node hAHi; player i must choose every action
aiAAiðhÞ with probability no smaller than e (this is in spirit of Selten [32]).
15 It is
clear than an analogy-based expectation equilibrium with such additional
constraints must exist. Call ðse;b
eÞ one such proﬁle of strategies andanalogy-based
expectations. By compactness properties (which holdin the ﬁnite environment case),
some subsequence must be converging to say ðs;bÞ; which is an analogy-based
expectation equilibrium. &
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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15This requires amending Deﬁnition 1 to incorporate such constraints in the maximization programs.
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Consider the centipede game CP depicted in Fig. 1 (see Rosenthal [26]). Two
players i ¼ 1;2 move in alternate order starting with player 2: There are 2K; KX2;
decision nodes as labelled in the ﬁgure. At each node, the player whose turn it is to
move, say player i; may either Take in which case this is the endor Pass, i.e.
Ai ¼f Pass;Takeg: The game also ends when player 1 Passes at node N
ð1Þ
1 : The
scalars at and bt deﬁne the payoffs at each terminal node. These scalars are assumed
to be non-negative andsatisfy (whenever applicable):
a2k 14a2kþ14a2k;
b2k 24b2k4b2k 1: ð2Þ
These conditions guarantee that (1) the unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE) of CP is such that players Take whenever they have to move
(this follows from a2kþ14a2k and b2k4b2k 1), and(2) in any period tp2K   2;
the player whose turn it is to move is better off if Take occurs two periods
later, i.e. in period t þ 2; than if it occurs in the current period t (this follows
from a2k 14a2kþ1 and b2k 24b2k ). Note that we do not impose any lower bound on
a2k or b2k 1: Thus, the set of conditions is compatible both with the original
Rosenthal’s version in which both players’ payoffs increase as the game moves
further andwith the d ollar game version (see Reny [25]) in which the player who
does not Take consistently gets the same low payoff, say 0; throughout the game. It
is also possible that the payoff obtained by the player who does not Take decreases
as the game moves further—we refer to the latter version as the decreasing loser’s
payoff version. Some of our discussion will differentiate between these various
payoff speciﬁcations.
4.1. The coarsest analogy grouping
Our main insight is that for a wide range of analogy grouping, players may keep
Passing for a large number of periods in equilibrium. To illustrate the claim, we ﬁrst
consider the situation in which both players use the coarsest analogy partition. That
is, each player i pools together all the nodes N
ðkÞ
j at which player j; ja i must move
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 1. The centipede game.
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ai ¼f ð j;N
ðkÞ
j Þ;1pkpKg:
In the environment with coarsest analogy grouping, we have:
Proposition 3. Suppose that for all kX1;
1
2 a2k 1 þ 1
2 a2k4a2kþ1
1
2 b2k 2 þ 1
2 b2k 14b2k: ð3Þ
There is a unique self-conﬁrming analogy-based expectation equilibrium in which Take
never occurs in the ﬁrst two periods: It is such that players keep Passing throughout the
game except in the last node N
ð1Þ
1 at which player 1 Takes.
Proposition 3 makes two points. First, there is an equilibrium outcome in which
Take occurs only at the ﬁnal decision node N
ð1Þ
1 : Second, there is no equilibrium
(whether in pure or in mixed strategy) in which Take occurs in the middle of the




1 ). Thus either Take occurs immediately (the
SPNE is an equilibrium in this setting too
16) or it occurs at the very endof the
game.
17
Proof of Proposition 3. First, it is readily veriﬁed that Take at the last node N
ð1Þ
1 can
be sustainedas an equilibrium. If players so behave, weak consistency implies that
(1) player 2 shouldexpect player 1 to Pass on average with probability K 1
K ; i.e.
b2ða2Þ¼K 1
K   Pass þ 1
K   Take (player 1 has K decisions nodes N
ðkÞ
1 each met with
probability 1; i.e. PsðN
ðkÞ
1 Þ¼1; andplayer 1 Takes only in one of these), and(2)
player 1 shouldexpect player 2 to Pass (on average) with probability 1 ; i.e. b1ða1Þ¼
Pass (since player 2 passes throughout the game). Clearly, player 1 is playing a best-
response to his expectation as he gets his maximal payoff. By Passing always, player
2 is also playing a best-response to his analogy-basedexpectation. Ind eedgiven that
b2ða2Þ¼l   Pass þð 1   lÞ Take with l41
2 and 1
2b2k 2 þ 1
2b2k 14b2k; at every node
N
ðkÞ
2 player 2 strictly prefer Passing (andTaking at N
ðk 1Þ
2 if k41) to Taking in the
current node.
Clearly, if the game reaches the last decision node N
ð1Þ
1 ; player 1 must Take (this is
his best strategy whatever his expectation). Thus, Take must occur at some decision
node. But, it is easy to see that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies in which









1 : The reason is that weak consistency wouldthen imply that player i should
expect player j to Pass with probability 1 (since he wouldnever Take on the
equilibrium path), andplayer i’s best-response to such an expectation is deﬁnitely
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16The corresponding analogy-based expectations are that players Take with probability 1:
17There is also an equilibrium in mixedstrategy in which each player i; i ¼ 1;2 plays in mixedstrategies
at his ﬁrst decision node N
ðKÞ
i ; andTakes with probability 1 thereafter.
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ðkÞ
i ; since player i couldincrease his payoff by Passing one
more time, say.
Proposition 3 also rules out the possibility of a mixedstrategy self-conﬁrming
analogy equilibrium in which each player i Passes with probability 1 at his ﬁrst
decision node. Again, if players Pass with probability 1 at their ﬁrst decision node,
weak consistency implies that the analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium of player i
shouldsatisfy
biðaiÞ¼l
i   Pass þð 1   l
iÞ Take with l
iX1
2:
(This is because the lowest Pass rate is obtainedwhen player i Takes with probability
1 at his second decision node N
ð2Þ
i andthe correspond ing Pass rate is 1
2:) Given our
assumption on payoffs, player i’s best-response to bi is either to Pass always for
player 2 or to Pass till node N
ð1Þ
1 for player 1: &
4.1.1. Length effect and coarse partitioning
Whenever condition (3) is not met, Proposition 3 does not apply, but we still get
similar insights for long enough versions of the game. More precisely, assume that
for all kX1; a2k 14r   a2kþ1 and b2k 24r   b2k with 24r41 andlet m be such that
r   m
mþ141: (Observe that m is set independently of K:)
It is readily veriﬁed that if both players Pass in their ﬁrst m decision nodes then in
any equilibrium of the coarsest analogy grouping environment players must keep
Passing till the last node N
ð1Þ
1 : Thus, for long enough versions of the game, either
Take occurs in the initial phase of the game (in the ﬁrst 2m decision nodes) or
otherwise the game must proceed to the very last decision node of the game at which
node player 1 Takes.
It is instructive to illustrate how increasing the length of the game may facilitate
the possibility of Passing toward the end of the game. Consider the following dollar
game version ða2k 2 ¼ b2k 1 ¼ 0Þ in which for all kX1; a2k 1 ¼ r   a2kþ1 and b2k 2 ¼
r   b2k where r ¼ 1:75 and a1 ¼ b0 ¼ 100: On can check that:
* When K ¼ 2; the highest Pass rate equilibrium is such that each Player i Passes
with probability 1 at node N
ð2Þ
i ; player 2 Passes with probability 3
4 ¼ r   1 at node
N
ð1Þ




* When KX3; the above behavioral strategies at nodes N
ðkÞ
i ; k ¼ 1;2 cannot be part
of an equilibrium andthe highest Pass rate equilibrium is such that players Pass
till the last node N
ð1Þ
1 at which node player 1 Takes.
19
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18The corresponding belief of player 2 is that player 1 Passes with probability 1
1þ3=4 ¼ 4
7 which multiplied
by r is exactly 1: Thus, player 2 is indeed indifferent between Passing and Taking at node N
ð1Þ
1 : The belief
of player 1 is that player 2 Passes with probability
1þ3=4
2 ¼ 7
8 which multipliedby r is strictly larger than 1:
Thus, player 1 strictly prefers Passing at node N
ð2Þ
1 (andTaking at nod e N
ð1Þ
1 ).
19When the outcome is Take at the last node, player 2’s belief is that player 1 Passes with probability
K 1
K X2
3 whenever KX3: Since 2
3   r41 the best response for player 2 is to Pass always.
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node N
ð2Þ
2 are not the same according to whether K ¼ 2o rKX3; even though the
subgames are identical in terms of move and payoff structure. The reason is that for
longer versions early Pass behaviors (at nodes N
ðkÞ
i ; kX3) typically raise the
expectation of the average Pass rate all over the game, andthus longer versions of
the game in which players keep Passing till node N
ð2Þ
2 result in higher Pass rate
expectations, which in turn induces more Pass behavior in the subgame starting at
N
ð2Þ
2 : This feature will be contrastedwith the insight arising with the crazy type
approach.
4.2. Arbitrary analogy grouping
So far we have only considered the coarsest analogy partitions. More generally:
Proposition 4. Suppose that condition ð3Þ holds. Consider an arbitrary proﬁle of
analogy partitions ðAn1;An2Þ; and let N
ðkÞ
i be the latest node
20 such that the analogy
class to which N
ðkÞ
i belongs is not a singleton.
21 Take at node N
ðkÞ
i can be sustained as
an equilibrium, and it is the equilibrium with highest Pass rate.
Proof. We rule out the case where both players use the ﬁnest partition for which
Proposition 4 trivially applies. We let aj be the non-singleton class that contains N
ðkÞ
i :
Since all nodes following N
ðkÞ
i are in a singleton class, backwardind uction arguments
imply that players Take whenever they have to move after node N
ðkÞ
i : At node N
ðkÞ
i
player i also ﬁnds it optimal to Take given that his expectation must be that player j
will Take in the next node. Thus, the highest possible Pass rate is obtained when
Take occurs at node N
ðkÞ





j   Pass þð 1   l
jÞ Take with l
jX1
2:
(This is because node N
ðkÞ
i is bundled with at least one earlier node N
ðk0Þ
i ; k04k and
at this node player i Passes with probability 1; also each node up to N
ðkÞ
i is met with
probability 1.) Under condition (3), such an expectation guarantees that player j
ﬁnds it optimal to Pass at the node preceding N
ðkÞ
i andit is read ily veriﬁedthat
Passing till node N
ðkÞ
i andTaking from nod e N
ðkÞ
i onwards constitutes a best-
response to the corresponding analogy-based expectations. &
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20That is, consider such a node N
ðkÞ
i (belonging to a non-singleton aj) with smallest k andchoose
player 1 in case of tie between the two players.
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is not in a singleton analogy class, there always exists an equilibrium with a very high
Pass rate.
Of course, there is still the possibility that Take occurs at an early stage for some
equilibria. But, if we impose the extra requirement that all analogy classes must be
reachedin equilibrium,
22 we get:
Proposition 5. Suppose that condition ð3Þ holds. Consider a proﬁle of analogy
partitions and let ðs;bÞ be a corresponding analogy-based expectation equilibrium in
pure strategies. If all analogy classes of both players are reached with positive




Proof. Take at node N
ð1Þ
1 is a possible equilibrium outcome when players use the
coarsest partition (see Proposition 3). Since all classes of both players are then
reachedwith positive probability, this outcome can be sustainedin the way required
by the proposition.
Suppose that another outcome, i.e. player i Takes at node N
ðkÞ
i with ði;kÞað1;1Þ;
were to emerge with the same requirements.
First, it cannot be that this outcome corresponds to the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium outcome, since then no node N
ðkÞ
1 wouldbe reached , andthus at least
one of the analogy classes of player 2 wouldnot be reachedin equilibrium.
If player i were to Pass at node N
ðkÞ
i this wouldleadto nod e N
ðk0Þ
j ; jai; with k0 ¼ k
if i ¼ 1a n dk0 ¼ k   1i fi ¼ 2: Since node N
ðk0Þ
j is not reachedin equilibrium and
since all analogy classes must be reachedwith positive probability, it must be that
there is an analogy class ai of player i such that ðj;N
ðk0Þ





j with k004k0 are not reached).
23 Since at any node N
ðk00Þ
j with
k00ok0 player j Passes with probability 1 (remember that Take at node N
ðkÞ
i is the
assumedoutcome), it must be that the analogy-basedexpectation of player i satisﬁes
biðaiÞ¼l
i   Pass þð 1   l
iÞ Take with l
iX1
2:
But given this expectation (and given condition (3)), Taking at node N
ðkÞ
i cannot be a
best-response to bi (at node N
ðkÞ
i ; player i shouldstrictly prefer Passing rather than
Taking). This leads to a contradiction. &
Observe that Proposition 5 does not pin down a single analogy grouping. Yet, it
guarantees that there must be a very high Pass rate on the equilibrium path of any
pure strategy equilibrium such that all classes are reachedwith positive probability.
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22Such a requirement may be relatedto the psychological trait that all contingencies shouldeventually
be relatedto some contingencies that have some familiarity to the player.
23There exists at least one such node because ði;kÞað1;1Þ:
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We now review how our approach differs from the existing approaches to the
ﬁnite horizon paradoxes:
Crazy type: The so calledcrazy type approach [16] is deﬁnitely the most inﬂuential
andpopular one. Appliedto the centiped e game, it can be d escribedas follows:
24
Suppose that with small but positive probability players behave mechanically and
Pass in all periods. The key insight of the crazy type approach is that players even
when rational will Pass most of the time. The reason is that if a rational player were
to Take at the start say, he couldeasily convince (accord ing to the sequential
equilibrium) his opponent that he is of the type who Passes always by Passing one
more time, andsuch a change of belief would , of course, be very beneﬁcial to the
player.
It shouldbe notedthat the rational agents of the crazy type approach are highly
sophisticatedin their ability to make inferences from observedbehaviors onto the
likelihood of their opponents’ types. It is thus not a model of bounded rationality in
contrast to the current approach (which assumes that players do not exactly identify
when their opponent stops Passing).
There are a few notable behavioral differences between the two approaches. While
in the analogy-basedapproach, it is never possible that player 1 Passes at the last
decision node N
ð1Þ
1 ; the crazy type approach does allow for this possibility when
player 1 is truly the type who Passes always (andthis is quite essential for the
argument to work). Furthermore, increasing the number of periods does not have
the same effect in the two approaches. In the analogy approach we have seen that
longer versions of the centipede game may increase the Pass rate in the last few nodes
(see above). By contrast, in the crazy type approach, if the rational types are assumed
to Pass till node N
ð2Þ
2 the play in the subgame starting at that node should be
independent of the total duration of the game (because the equilibrium belief as to
whether or not one faces a crazy type is not affectedby this total d uration).
Complexity: Another approach is that players are constrainedin the complexity of
the strategies they can employ Neyman [21].
25 To illustrate the approach, assume
that player 1 is constrainedto use a strategy d escribable by a machine with no more
than J states, JoK: A machine with at most J states does not allow player 1 to
differentiate his behavior in periods t; tp2ðK   JÞ 1: Thus, whenever player 1’
strategy is constrainedto use no more that J states, and a2k 1pa0 for all k;
KpkoK   J; Passing for both players in all periods is an equilibrium. Note that the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
24It was originally appliedto the ﬁnitely repeatedprisoner’s d ilemma. To apply our approach to the
ﬁnitely repeatedprisoner’s d ilemma, suppose, for example, that players use two analogy classes
categorizing histories according to whether or not some opportunistic behavior was played earlier in the
interaction, Cooperating in all but the last periodis an analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium (see Jehiel
[14] for details).
25See also Rubinstein [27], Abreu andRubinstein [1] andRubinstein [30, Chapter 9] for a related
approach in which players not only care about their material payoff, but also about the complexity of their
strategy.
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decision nodes (which can never arise in the analogy-based approach in which Take
must occur at least at node N
ð1Þ
1 ). Note also that in the dollar game version of the
game we have that a0 ¼ 0; and a2K 14a0: Thus, Passing in all periods is not an
equilibrium in the bounded complexity approach. More generally, in the dollar game
or decreasing loser’s payoff speciﬁcations, the only possible equilibrium outcome of
the bounded complexity approach is that player 2 Takes at his ﬁrst decision node.
This shouldagain be contrastedwith the analogy-basedapproach (see Proposition 3
which applies equally to all such payoff speciﬁcations).
Imperfect recall: A thirdapproach is that players have imperfect recall andd o not
remember exactly at which stage of the game they currently are (see Piccione and
Rubinstein [23] andDulleck andOechssler [5] for an application to the centipede
game). For the sake of illustration, assume that each player i ¼ 1;2 has a unique
memory set consisting of all his decisions nodes. That is, player i has no idea at
which node N
ðkÞ
i ; k ¼ 1;y;K he currently is. For K large enough, an equilibrium in
this setting is that each player i Passes with probability 1 in his unique memory/
information set.
26 Note that the prediction is that both players Pass with probability
1 in all periods. This prediction arises because players do not perceive that there is an
end, which in turn forces the players to have the same behavior independently of the
decision node. This is in sharp contrast with the analogy-based approach in which
players do perceive that there is an end no matter how they categorize their
opponent’s nodes into analogy classes (for example, in the coarsest partitioning
player 1 always Takes at his last decision node N
ð1Þ
1 ; thus revealing that he does
perceive that there is an end).
5. Application to bargaining and ultimatum games
In this section, we brieﬂy apply the analogy-basedapproach to take-it-or-leave-it
andbargaining games.
5.1. Take-it-or-leave-it
Consider the following situation. There are two players i ¼ 1;2 anda pie of size 1 :
Player 1 makes a partition offer ðx;1   xÞ; xA½0;1  to player 2 who may either accept
or reject it.
27 If he accepts, players 1 and2 get x and1   x; respectively. If player 2
rejects the offer, player 1 gets 0 andplayer 2 gets an outsid e option payoff equal to
vout; where 0ovouto1:
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26The point is that player i cannot adjust the best time for Taking, as he does not know at which N
ðkÞ
i he
currently is. He prefers Passing always in this case.
27The action space of player 1 in this example is continuous (which is not coveredby the framework of
Section 3). The analysis presentedbelow can be viewedas correspond ing to the limit of the ﬁnite gridcase
as the gridbecomes ﬁner andﬁner.
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player 2 will accept it. When player 1 forms his expectation about player 2’s
probability of acceptance by analogy, we now show that it may well be that either
player 1 makes a much more generous offer than vout to player 2 or that player 1
makes an offer that is rejectedby player 2 d epend ing on the partitioning.
Speciﬁcally, a node at which player 2 must move can be identiﬁed with x where
ðx;1   xÞ is the offer made by player 1: We assume that player 1 partitions the set of
ð2;xÞ into two classes:
28
alow
1 ¼f ð 2;xÞj% xoxp1g;
a
high




1 ) corresponds to the class of outrageous (resp. generous) offers.
Proposition 6. (1) When 1   % xovout; any analogy-based expectation equilibrium
is such that there is no agreement: player 1 gets 0; player 2 gets vout: (2) When
vouto1   % x; there is a unique analogy-based expectation equilibrium: player 1
proposes ð% x;1   % xÞ; and player 2 accepts.
Proof. The analogy-basedexpectation of player 1 is of the form b1ðar
1Þ¼l
r  ‘Accepts’
þð1   l
rÞ  ‘Rejects’ with r ¼ low; high. If l
high40 (resp. l
low40), player 1’s best-
response to b1 cannot be to offer ðx;1   xÞ with xo% x (resp. % xoxo1). (1) When
1   % xovout; neither ð1;0Þ nor ð% x;1   % xÞ are acceptable by player 2: Only a
disagreement can occur. (2) When vouto1   % x; l
high ¼ 1; l
low ¼ 0; player 1 proposing
ð% x;1   % xÞ andplayer 2 accepting any offer ðx;1   xÞ with 1   xXvout gives rise to an
analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium. It is also easy to see that there is no other
analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium. (For example, a d isagreement cannot be part of
an equilibrium, because strong consistency wouldforce l
high ¼ 1: Thus, offering ð% x;1  
% xÞ is a better option for player 1 than just opting out, leading to a contradiction.) &
The intuition underlying this result is rather immediate. The analogy-based
approach leads the proposer to have the same expectation about the acceptance rate
for all offers lying in a given analogy class. Thus, conditional on making an offer in a
given analogy class, best-response will induce the proposer to pick the least generous
offer among these. So analogy grouping has the effect of (endogenously) discretizing
the action space of the proposer (to the lower extreme points of his analogy classes),
which in turn explains why there may be disagreement or the responder need not be
stuck to his reservation utility.
29
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28The intervals are closedas ind icatedto guarantee the existence of an equilibrium.
29The approach shouldbe contrastedwith an approach (in the spirit of Dow [4] or Rubinstein [29])i n
which the responder would have a coarse perception of the proposer’s offers. In such an approach, the
responder has the same behavior in terms of acceptance for all offers lying in a given information/
perception set because he does not distinguish them. By contrast, in the analogy-based approach the
decision of acceptance need not be the same for two offers corresponding to the same analogy class.
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The situation is now as follows. There are two players i ¼ 1;2 anda pie of size 1 :
The game governing the division of the pie is either an alternating offer bargaining
game a ` la Rubinstein R (with a discount factor assumed to be close to 1 for both
players), or an ultimatum game U1 in which player 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
to party 2 (who is assumedto get 0 if he refuses the d eal) or an ultimatum game U2
symmetrically deﬁned in which player 2 makes the offer. Each game arises with
probability 1
3; andto simplify the exposition, we assume that the offers are
constrainedto be ð1=4;3=4Þ; ð1=2;1=2Þ or ð3=4;1=4Þ:
Standard analysis would tell that in Ui the proposer shouldpropose 3
4 for himself,
which should be accepted by the responder. Regarding bargaining game R; an
equilibrium is that players always propose the equal split ð1
2; 1
2Þ; andit is accepted .
Suppose now that in order to assess the acceptance probability players do not
distinguish between ultimatum and bargaining games whereas (unlike in Section 5.1)
they do distinguish between the acceptance probability attached to the various
possible offers.
It is readily veriﬁed that the path induced by the above SPNE can no longer arise
with such an analogy grouping. If it were, consistency wouldimply that each player i
shouldexpect that an offer of 3 =4 for himself shouldbe accepted(in ultimatum and
bargaining games)—such an offer wouldonly be mad e in ultimatum games where it
would be accepted. But, with such an expectation a player would deﬁnitely not
propose an equal split offer in the bargaining game R (he wouldrather propose 3 =4
for himself).
A possible analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium in this setting is that (1) players
always propose an equal split ð1
2; 1
2Þ in both the bargaining game andthe ultimatum
game; (2) all offers are acceptedin the ultimatum game; the equal split ð1
2; 1
2Þ offer and
any more generous offer is acceptedin the bargaining game; (3) when a player
proposes 3=4 for himself he expects the offer to be rejectedwith probability 1 =2;
30
andwhen a player proposes 1 =2 or less for himself he expects the offer to be accepted
(with probability 1).
Observe that this setting too explains why the responder need not get the payoff
closest to his reservation utility in ultimatum games. But, the argument is totally
different from that developed in Section 5.1. It is the analogy with the fact that an
outrageous offer is rejectedin bargaining games that d eters the proposer in the
ultimatum game from making such an offer. It shouldbe notedthat the respond er
does not behave in the same way in the bargaining and ultimatum games. Thus,
players do not confound the Rubinstein and ultimatum games. That is, using the
automaton theory jargon players use different states of their machine/strategy to
play the Rubinstein andultimatum games. This shouldbe contrastedwith
Samuelson [31] who develops an approach (in the automaton tradition) to explain
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proposedwith the same probability in both R and U1 (resp. U2).
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with more frequently playedgames (presumably bargaining game) into a single state
in order to save on the complexity costs that result from using strategies/machines
that distinguish between the various games.
6. On endogenizing the analogy grouping
So far the analogy grouping usedby the players was viewedas exogenous.
Understanding how players categorize contingencies into analogy classes is a very
challenging task left for future research. This short section is an attempt to suggest
some tentative avenues for endogenizing the analogy grouping. More work both on
the theory andempirical/experimental sid es will be requiredto assess the relevance of
these various approaches (andothers).
6.1. Analogy-based expectation and similar play
One approach adopts the view that in order for player i to pool several nodes ðj;hÞ
into a single class of analogy, player i shouldhimself consid er playing in the same
way in some pool of nodes. One difﬁculty is that in general player i neednot move in
the same nodes as player j; andtherefore one shouldalso worry about which nod es
h0AHi player i considers as being similar to nodes hAHj:
A class of situations in which this issue can be addressed simply is one in which
whenever player i bundles two elements ðj;hÞ and ðj0;h0Þ into the same analogy class ai;
player i also has to move in h and h0: Andthe property is that player i behaves in the
same way in nodes h and h0: An application of this idea is now being considered to
illustrate how equilibria other than the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium may emerge.
Consider the following two-stage two-player game. Player 1 moves ﬁrst and chooses
between the normal form game G or G0: In both G and G0; players 1 and2 move
simultaneously, andin both G and G0; player 1 chooses in A1 ¼f U;Dg; player 2
chooses in A2 ¼f L;Rg: We assume that U is a dominant strategy in both G and G0 for
player 1: Player 2’s best-response to U is R in game G; whereas it is L in game G0:
Finally, we assume that player 1 derives a higher payoff when ðU;RÞ is playedin game
G than when ðU;LÞ is playedin game G0: Finally, we assume that player 1 derives a
higher payoff when ðU;LÞ is playedin game G0 than when ðU;LÞ is playedin game G:
The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is such that player 1 chooses game
G andthen ðU;RÞ occurs.
31
Suppose that player 1 puts in the same analogy class ð2;GÞ and ð2;G0Þ in order to
predict player 2’s behavior. Note ﬁrst that player 1 behaves in the same way in G and
G0 (he has the same dominant strategy in both games). Thus, the required property is
satisﬁed. Second, it is readily veriﬁed that an equilibrium outcome in this analogy
setting is that player 1 chooses G0 (expecting player 2 to play L in both G and G0),
since player 1 prefers ðU;LÞ in game G0 to ðU;LÞ in game G:
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Another approach is to view the analogy grouping as resulting from a learning/
evolutionary process in which players wouldeventually learn to group contingencies
in an optimal manner. There are several ways to implement this idea. Suppose, for
example, that after choosing their analogy grouping, the same set of players keep
interacting with each other until the system stabilizes to an analogy-based
expectation equilibrium (for the chosen proﬁle of analogy grouping), andsuppose
players have an opportunity to adjust their choice of analogy grouping in an optimal
manner. From a game theoretic viewpoint, this amounts to considering a two stage-
game: in the ﬁrst stage, players choose their analogy partition, andin the second
stage they play the resulting analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium. We assume that
a player assesses his choice of analogy grouping according to the payoff that results
from it in the secondstage.
32
It is beyondthe scope of this paper to analyze the implications of this approach,
but note that even if there are no costs to having extra analogy classes, the approach
neednot leadthe players to select the ﬁnest analogy grouping.
As an illustration, it can be checkedthat in the example consid eredin Section 2,
player 1 choosing the coarse partition andplayer 2 choosing the ﬁne partition is part
of an equilibrium.
33
As a further illustration, consider the centipede game studied in Section 4, and
assume that condition (3) holds. Focussing on the highest Pass rate equilibrium
identiﬁed in Proposition 4, we observe that player 2 (resp. player 1) can guarantee a
payoff of b1 (resp. a2) by choosing the coarsest partition (whatever the partition
chosen by the other player). Thus, in the cooperative version of the centipede game
where, say a24a5 and b14b4; (andfor K not too small) the resulting equilibrium
outcome must be that players get a payoff corresponding to a very high Pass rate. By
contrast, in the dollar game or decreasing loser’s payoff speciﬁcations however, both
players choosing the ﬁnest partition constitutes an equilibrium.
34;35
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32There are alternative criteria. One alternative criterion is that players have aspiration levels andfeel
happy with their analogy partition, as long as the resulting payoff is not below their aspiration level.
Another view is that players assess their analogy partitions according to the payoffs they perceive they will
get in the ensuing equilibrium where the perception is assumedto be basedon the ensuing analogy-based
expectations (rather than on the effective payoff).
33(1) If both players use the ﬁne partition, ðU;RÞ is playedin G and ðD;R0Þ in G0 resulting in a payoff
proﬁle of ð2;4Þ:
(2) If player 1 uses the coarse partition andplayer 2 uses the ﬁne partition, we have seen that ðD;LÞ is
playedin G and ðU;MÞ is playedin G0 resulting in an expectedpayoff proﬁle of ð4;2:5).
(3) If both players use the coarse partition, it can be checkedthat ðD;LÞ in G and ðU;R0Þ in G0 constitute
an equilibrium resulting in an expectedpayoff proﬁle of ð2:5;2Þ:
34Under those payoff speciﬁcations, it is quite essential not to be the loser (the player who does not
Take). This in turn implies that it is a weakly dominant strategy choice to use the ﬁnest analogy grouping.
35The contrast between the implications of the various payoff speciﬁcations wouldalso arise in the
complexity approach developed by Rubinstein [30, Chapter 9].
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The literature on learning in games has emphasizedthat a Nash equilibrium need
not emerge as a result of learning if, at the learning stage, players imperfectly observe
the strategy of their opponents, andit has proposedthe alternative concept of self-
conﬁrming equilibrium or conjectural equilibrium (see, in particular, Fudenberg and
Kreps [8], Battigalli et al. [2] andFud enberg andLevine [9, Chapter 6]). Most of this
literature assumes that the learning agents observe the equilibrium path after each
roundof the learning process. A notable exception is Battigalli et al. [2] who consider
more general signal structures. When general signal structures are considered, the
main insights are about ﬁnding conditions under which conjectural equilibria are
equivalent to Nash equilibria.
36 The analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium can be
interpreted
37 as an equilibrium in this tradition in which each player i wouldnot
observe the equilibrium path, but only the average behavior of his opponents in
every analogy class ai at every step of the learning process.
38 But, by contrast with
the insights developed in the conjectural equilibrium literature with general signal
structures, the extra structure imposedby the analogy grouping id ea has ledus to
propose a natural (or focal) notion of equilibrium, which happens to radically differ
from existing equilibrium concepts (in particular, the Nash equilibrium).
Another relevant strandof literature is, of course, the literature on bound ed
rationality in games. Other approaches to bounded rationality (following the lead of
Simon [34]) include the e-equilibrium [24], the quantal response equilibrium [18],
limitedforesight mod els [12,13,15], games with procedurally rational players [22],
andmore recently the (partially) cursedequilibrium [7].
39
The e-equilibrium andthe quantal response equilibrium approaches d o not
challenge the cognitive rationality of the players, since players are assumed(in
equilibrium) to know perfectly the reaction function of their opponents. Like this
paper, models of limited foresight do challenge the cognitive rationality of the
players, but the implication of limitedforesight is very d ifferent from that of analogy
grouping.
40 In Osborne andRubinstein [22] too, players do not rightly perceive the
behavior of their opponent (players use a heuristic basedon the id ea that they play
against Nature). But, unlike this paper, the interpretation is that players have an
erroneous perception of the game being played(see Camerer [3] for an experimental
account of misperceptions of games). Finally, Eyster–Rabin’s [7] (partially) cursed
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36The reason is that signals in such a general approach have no structures, andthe (only) focal
conjectural equilibria are the Nash equilibria.
37It may be more natural though to say that player i observes more, but that he only keeps track of such
statistics because he thinks—possibly wrongly—that these are enough.
38Strictly speaking, one needs to have populations of players playing the game and the signals must bear
on the average behavior throughout the population. Moreover, the notion of rationality is sequential in
the analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium approach while it is not in the conjectural equilibrium
approach.
39This review does not include approaches with fairness considerations or other approaches consisting
in modifying the underlying preferences of the players.
40For example, limitedforesight cannot explain cooperation in the ﬁnitely repeatedprisoner’s d ilemma
or the centipede game.
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imperfectly aware of the common value element of the game. Despite some common
motivations, the approaches to partial sophistication (the main theme of this and
their paper) are completely different in Eyster–Rabin and this paper.
41 Besides,
Eyster–Rabin’ setup is a static one of incomplete information whereas this paper
considers multi-stage games with complete information.
There are many facets to analogy thinking. Other approaches in economics
include the axiomatic approaches of Rubinstein [28] andGilboa–Schmeid ler [11]
about similarity and case-based decision theory, respectively (which derive
representation theorems for some axiomatic). These also include the automata
theory developed for game theory by Rubinstein [27], andAbreu–Rubinstein [1] (see
also Samuelson [31]).
42 It shouldbe notedthat none of these other approaches
considers the treatment of expectations (as opposed to behaviors) by analogy. In a
recent paper, Eliaz [6] proposes a solution concept in which players care about
having simple representations of their opponents’ strategies. In equilibrium, he
imposes that the ‘‘simpliﬁed’’ representation held by every player i about player j’s
strategy coincides with player j’s effective strategy (see also Spiegler [35] for a related
solution concept with a similar feature). This feature is markedly different from the
spirit of the analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium in which the representation of
others’ strategies neednot coincid e with their effective strategies.
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